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ABSTRACT 
 
The self is a multifaceted entity. Studies of the self as it relates to the body (the 
‘bodily self’) have revealed three crucial aspects of bodily self-consciousness: (1) 
ownership (2) self-location and (3) visuo-spatial perspective. The normal bodily self 
includes the representation of an owned body (1), and the self is experienced as being 
localized within this owned body (embodied), at a definite location in space (2). 
Moreover, in healthy humans, the external world is experienced from this location, i.e. 
consciousness has an inherent visuo-spatial perspective (3) whose origin normally 
coincides with self-location. Scientists  have only very recently begun to investigate the 
links between these different aspects and their underlying neural bases (Arzy, Seeck, 
Ortigue, Spinelli, & Blanke, 2006a; Aspell, Lenggenhager, & Blanke, 2009; Ehrsson, 
2007; Ehrsson & Petkova, 2008; Lenggenhager, Mouthon, & Blanke, 2009; 
Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007). Here we argue that the scientific 
understanding of the bodily self can be informed by the study of OBEs because these 
aspects of the self are experienced as spatially distinct from the physical body during 
these experiences (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004). How is it possible that these 
features of the bodily self can ‘come apart’ in an OBE? The study of what causes them to 
dissociate in an OBE and the examination of how these aspects of the bodily self relate to 
behavior and neural processing in healthy subjects will provide important insights into 
how these aspects of self are related: phenomenally, behaviorally and neurally.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
If you ever had the experience of lying in bed, about to fall asleep, when suddenly you 
had the distinct impression of floating up near the ceiling and looking back down at your 
body on the bed, then it is likely that you had an out-of-body experience (OBE). Here is a 
description of an OBE by Sylvan Muldoon, one of the first authors to describe his own OBEs 
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(and those of others) in great detail: “I was floating in the very air, rigidly horizontal, a few 
feet above the bed […] I was moving toward the ceiling, horizontal and powerless […]  I 
managed to turn around and there […] was another ‘me’ lying quietly upon the bed” 
(Muldoon & Carrington, 1929) (Fig.1).   
 
 
Figure 1. Depiction of the phenomenology of the OBE with elevated self-location (the light upper 
body), visuo-spatial perspective, and autoscopy (the body shown on the bed). [Modified version of a 
figure from (Muldoon & Carrington, 1929)] 
OBEs are bizarre departures from normal human experience but they are much more than 
a mere curiosity for science and the humanities: an OBE is effectively a breakdown of the 
bodily self, thus the study of this phenomenon is likely to lead to insights into the bodily 
foundations of self-consciousness. OBEs can be characterized by three phenomenological 
elements: the impression (1) that the self is localized outside one’s body (disembodiment or 
extracorporeal self-location), (2) of seeing the world from an extracorporeal and elevated 
perspective, and (3) of seeing one’s own body from this perspective (Blanke et al., 2004; 
Irwin, 1985). OBEs are striking phenomena because they challenge our everyday experience 
of the spatial unity of self and body,: the experience of a “real me” that ‘resides’ in my body 
and is the subject or “I” of experience and thought (Blackmore, 1982).  
OBEs have been reported since time immemorial and have been estimated to occur in 
about 5% of the general population (Blackmore, 1982; Irwin, 1985). OBEs also occur in 
various medical conditions (Blanke et al., 2004), and several precipitating factors have been 
determined including certain types of neurological and psychiatric disease. In healthy subjects 
they may also occur during hypnagogic and hypnopompic hallucinations (Cheyne & Girard, 
2009; Terhune, 2009). They can also occur in cases of awareness during general anesthesia, 
sensory deprivation, marijuana use, rapid body position changes (as during falls or car 
accidents) and extreme fear (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). To date, only a few neurological and 
neuroscientific investigations have been carried out on OBEs, probably because, in general, 
they occur spontaneously, are of short duration, and happen only once or twice in a lifetime 
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(Irwin, 1985). Investigations of neurological patients with OBEs have several advantages as 
OBEs in patients may occur repeatedly, sometimes in quick succession, and in rare instances 
can be induced by electrical stimulation of the brain (Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002; 
De Ridder, Van Laere, Dupont, Menovsky, & Van de Heyning, 2007; Penfield, 1955). An 
individual undergoing an OBE usually experiences a dissociation between his self-location 
and his visuo-spatial perspective with respect to the felt and/or seen location of his own body 
– in other words, he perceives his own body (and the world) from a spatial location that does 
not coincide with the felt and seen position of his body (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke & Mohr, 
2005; Brugger, Regard, & Landis, 1997). In OBEs the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective 
is co-localized with self-location (as it is for healthy subjects), but the body is experienced at 
a different location. What causes this dissociation of unity between self and body? In this 
chapter we will present a description of the neurology and neuroscience of OBEs and we will 
argue that studying OBEs and their involved brain mechanisms provide unique opportunities 
for gaining a scientific understanding of the bodily self. We will also present recent findings 
from studies with healthy subjects which have sought to simulate, via controlled experimental 
manipulations, some of the aspects of the out-of-body experience, in order to understand the 
role of multisensory integration in OBEs and more generally, in bodily self-representation.  
 
 
THE OUT-OF-BODY EXPERIENCE: ETIOLOGY AND ANATOMY 
 
Out-of-body experiences have been reported to occur in various generalized and focal 
diseases of the central nervous system. OBEs associated with focal damage typically occur in 
cases of epilepsy, traumatic brain injury, vascular brain damage and migraine (Devinsky, 
Feldmann, Burrowes, & Bromfield, 1989; Kölmel, 1985; Lippman, 1953; Todd & Dewhurst, 
1955). Generalized neurological etiologies include generalized epilepsy, cerebral infections 
(e.g. meningitis and encephalitis) and intoxication (Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger et al., 1997; 
Dening & Berrios, 1994; Devinsky et al., 1989; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Lhermitte, 
1939). OBEs of focal origin mainly implicate posterior regions of the brain and some authors 
have suggested a primary involvement of either the temporal or parietal lobe (Blanke et al., 
2004; Devinsky et al., 1989; Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952; Todd & Dewhurst, 1955). There 
is no consensus on whether the left or right hemisphere is more involved in OBEs: some 
authors found no hemispheric predominance (Dening & Berrios, 1994; Devinsky et al., 1989; 
Hécaen & Ajuriaguerra, 1952) but others have suggested that the right hemisphere is more 
implicated (Brugger et al., 1997; Grüsser & Landis, 1991). More recently, Blanke and 
colleagues (Blanke et al., 2004) argued for a crucial role for the cortex at the temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ; Fig.2) of the right hemisphere. The crucial role of the right TPJ has been 
suggested because lesion overlap in several patients with OBEs centered on this region 
(Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke & Mohr, 2005), electrical stimulation of this region can give rise 
to OBE-like experiences (Blanke et al., 2002; De Ridder et al., 2007; Penfield & Erickson, 
1941), and because the TPJ is activated during mental imagery of disembodied self-location 
(Arzy, Thut, Mohr, Michel, & Blanke, 2006b).  
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A. 
 
 
B. 
Figure 2(A). Mean lesion overlap analysis of five patients from (Blanke et al., 2004). Each color 
represents a different patient Mean overlap analysis is centered on the TPJ. [Modified version of a 
figure from (Blanke et al., 2004)] (B) - Mean lesion locations in patients with autoscopic hallucinations 
and out-of-body experiences. Lesion locations of eight patients with autoscopic hallucination (Blanke & 
Castillo, 2007)  are represented by the light yellow color with the region of maximum overlap - in a 
dark yellow color – centering on temporo-occpital and parieto-occipital cortex. In contrast, the centre of 
lesion overlap for a group of patients with OBEs (Blanke & Mohr, 2005) is at the temporo-parietal 
junction (dark pink color). [Modified version of a figure from (Blanke & Castillo, 2007)] 
Other work suggests that damage to certain subcortical structures such as the brainstem 
and the spinal cord may also be associated with OBEs. OBEs frequently occur during dreams 
(Green, 1968; Muldoon & Carrington, 1929) and it has been hypothesized that the 
generalized paralysis that occurs during REM-sleep dreams might be a precipitating factor of 
such OBEs (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). In keeping with this, other studies found that subjects 
with near death experiences that include OBEs commonly have sleep paralysis (Nelson, 
Mattingly, Lee, & Schmitt, 2006; Nelson, Mattingly, & Schmitt, 2007; see also Dieguez & 
Blanke, 2008). It has also been speculated that bodily mechanisms related to abnormal motor 
and somatosensory signals may lead to OBEs during general anesthesia (Bünning & Blanke, 
2005). In general anesthesia, somatosensory and motor signals from the body are disturbed 
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due to the application of muscle relaxants while the patient is in a state of partial awareness. 
The resulting conflicting condition (partial awareness combined with abnormal 
somatosensory and motor signals) has been proposed as one of the main patho-mechanisms 
for awareness during general anesthesia (Blacher, 1975; Moerman, Bonke, & Oosting, 1993; 
Sandin, Enlund, Samuelsson, & Lennmarken, 2000; Spitellie, Holmes, & Domino, 2002) and 
might also account for OBEs in these circumstances (Bünning & Blanke, 2005). Thus, 
disturbed somatosensory and sensorimotor signals from large parts of the body in (1) 
tetraplegia with severe somatosensory loss, (2) general anesthesia (Moerman et al., 1993), and 
(3) during sleep paralysis (Nelson et al., 2006) seem to disturb the integration of multisensory 
body-related information in personal space due to interference with brainstem, spinal cord 
and peripheral nervous system signaling information from the somatosensory and motor 
systems. As REM intrusions or sleep paralysis have been linked to damage or interference 
with brainstem mechanisms, the recent observation of an OBE following a spinal cord lesion 
(Overney, Arzy, & Blanke, 2009) implicates cervical spinal cord mechanisms. OBEs during 
general anesthesia and in patients suffering from Guillan-Barré syndrome (Cochen et al., 
2005) even point to the implication of the peripheral nervous system.  
 
 
MULTISENSORY DIS-INTEGRATION IN OBES 
 
The anatomical, phenomenological and behavioral data collected from patients has led to 
the hypothesis that the abnormal perceptions in OBEs are due to selective deficits in 
integrating multisensory body-related information into a single coherent neural representation 
of one’s body and its position in extra-personal space (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke & Mohr, 
2005). This theory extended previous propositions made for the related phenomena of 
phantom limb sensations (Brugger, 2002; Brugger et al., 1997) and synesthesia (Irwin, 1985). 
Furthermore, the OBE deficits have been attributed to abnormal processing at the TPJ, as 
mentioned earlier, TPJ lesions are found in patients with OBEs (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke 
& Mohr, 2005) and neuroimaging studies (Arzy et al., 2006b; Blanke et al., 2005; Vallar et 
al., 1999) have shown that this region plays an important role in multisensory integration, 
embodiment and in generating an egocentric perspective in healthy subjects (see also 
Bremmer, Schlack, Duhamel, Graf, & Fink, 2001; Calvert, Campbell, & Brammer, 2000; and 
Leube et al., 2003). 
More precisely, Blanke and colleagues (Blanke et al., 2004; Blanke & Mohr, 2005) have 
proposed that OBEs occur when there is (1) a disintegration in own-body (personal) space 
because of incongruent tactile, proprioceptive and visual inputs alongside (2) a disintegration 
between personal and extrapersonal space due to incongruent vestibular and visual inputs. 
They further suggested that the phenomenological variation between different types of 
autoscopic phenomena - the group of illusions that affect the experience of the entire body 
and include OBEs, heautoscopy and autoscopic hallucination - can be explained by different 
levels of vestibular disturbance. Vestibular dysfunction is greatest in OBEs, which are 
strongly associated with feelings of floating and elevation (usually absent in autoscopic 
hallucinations (Blanke et al., 2004)). During autoscopic hallucinations patients see their body 
in extrapersonal space, but there is no disembodiment and no self-attribution (ownership) of 
the illusory extracorporeal body (Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger et al., 1997). The pronounced 
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vestibular disturbance in OBEs fits with the greater implication of the TPJ in this disorder 
(Blanke & Mohr, 2005; Lopez, Halje, & Blanke, 2008), as the core region of vestibular cortex 
is located in the TPJ (Brandt & Dieterich, 1999; Fasold et al., 2002; Lobel, Kleine, Bihan, 
Leroy-Willig, & Berthoz, 1998). 
 
 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE BODILY SELF IN HEALTHY SUBJECTS 
 
How can the relations between the different aspects of the bodily self that are dissociated 
in OBEs be investigated in healthy subjects in the research laboratory? Two groups (Ehrsson, 
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007) separately developed novel techniques to dissociate (1) the 
location of the physical body, (2) the location of the self (self-location), (3) the location of the 
origin of the visuo-spatial perspective, and (4) self-identification. Both groups utilized 
congruent and incongruent visual-tactile stimulation to alter these four aspects of bodily self-
consciousness, thereby extending a protocol similar to that used in a related corporeal illusion 
- the rubber hand illusion (RHI; Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) - to the full body (see Fig. 3). The 
general idea in these full body studies is to mislead subjects about where they experience their 
body and/or self to be, and/or with what location and which body they self-identify with. To 
achieve this, a visual (real-time video) image of their body was presented via a head-
mounted-display (HMD) that was linked to a video camera that filmed their back from behind 
(Fig. 3). They were thus able to see themselves from an ‘outside’ or third-person perspective, 
as though they were viewing their own body from the visuo-spatial perspective of the camera. 
In one study (Lenggenhager et al., 2007), subjects viewed the video image of themselves (the 
‘virtual body’) while they were stroked on their back with a stick. This stroking was felt and 
also seen, and the seen stroking was either synchronous with the felt stroking (i.e. the touch 
was seen on the same part on the body as where it was simultaneously felt) or was 
asynchronous with it (when a video delay was added). The stroking manipulation thus 
generated either congruent (synchronous) or incongruent (asynchronous) visuo-tactile 
stimulation, and this has been shown to affect the perception of hand ownership and hand 
location in the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). It was found that (1) the illusion of self-
identification with the virtual body (i.e. global ownership, the feeling that ‘the virtual body is 
my body’) and (2) the referral of touch (‘feeling the touch of the stick where I saw it touching 
my virtual body’) were stronger when subjects were stroked synchronously than when they 
were stroked asynchronously (Lenggenhager et al., 2007). Self-location was also measured by 
passively displacing the body of the blindfolded subjects after the stroking period and then 
asking them to walk back to the original position. Note that, as predicted, self-location was 
experienced at a position that was closer to the virtual body, as if subjects were located “in 
front” of the position where they had been standing during the experiment. This ensemble of 
measures has been termed the full body illusion (FBI).  
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Figure 3. Experimental set-up in synchronous (back) stroking condition in (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) 
[top panel] and in synchronous (chest) stroking condition in (Ehrsson, 2007) [bottom panel]. In both 
panels the physical body of the subject is light-colored and the dark-colored body indicates the 
hypothesized location of the perceived body (bodily self). [Modified version of a figure from 
(Lenggenhager et al., 2009)] 
In a related study (Ehrsson, 2007) subjects were stroked on their chest (Fig. 3). They 
were seated while they viewed themselves (via an HMD) from behind, and they could see a 
stick moving (synchronous or asynchronous with the touch) just below the camera’s lens. In 
this case, subjects (1) felt that the stick they saw was touching their real chest, (2) self-
identified with the camera’s location and felt that looking at the virtual body was like viewing 
the body of someone else. Self-location was not quantified in this study by using the drift 
measure as in (Lenggenhager et al., 2007); instead, a threatening stimulus was presented to 
the apparent location of the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective (just below the camera). 
The skin conductance response to a swinging hammer (approaching the camera) was found to 
be higher during synchronous stroking than during asynchronous, providing implicit 
physiological evidence that subjects identified and localized themselves to the position of the 
camera. 
There were several differences in bodily experiences in these two similar set-ups, and it is 
worth considering what may account for these. Meyer (Meyer, 2008) proposed (in a response 
to these studies) that in both set-ups the brain may use at least four different sources of 
information to generate the conscious experience of self-location and self-identification: (1) 
where the body is seen (2) where the world is seen from (the origin of the visuo-spatial 
perspective) (3) where the touch is seen to occur and (4) where the touch is felt to occur. 
(Although Meyer separates (1) and (3) it is not clear that these can be classified as different 
cues/sources of information). These four ‘cues’ do not correspond in the experimental set-ups 
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(but of course in everyday life, they usually do). Meyer argued that the most important of 
these cues (for the conscious experience of self-location) might be where the touch is seen to 
occur (i.e. where the stroking stick is seen). He concluded this because, firstly, in neither set-
up did self-location (measured by drift (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) and/or questionnaire 
scores (Ehrsson, 2007) exactly coincide with the location where the touch was felt (i.e. where 
the physical body was located). Secondly, the seen location of the virtual body biased self-
location in one study (Lenggenhager et al., 2007) but not in the other (Ehrsson, 2007), and 
thirdly, the location of the visuo-spatial perspective corresponded to self-location in Ehrsson 
(2007) but not in Lenggenhager et al. (2007). However, in both cases, self-location coincided 
with (or more accurately, was biased towards) the location where the touch was seen to occur 
(i.e. the seen location of the stroking stick).  
It is not very surprising that the tactile sense appears to have the weakest role in 
determining self-location. Touch, after all, cannot give any reliable information regarding the 
location of the body in external space, except via tactile contact with external surfaces. There 
is, however, an additional important point to consider regarding the four cues. As pointed out 
by Blanke et al.’s (Blanke, Metzinger, & Lenggenhager, 2008) response to (Meyer, 2008), 
self-location was biased towards the virtual body more when the seen stroking was 
synchronous with the felt stroking than when it was asynchronous. Thus, the congruence 
between tactile and visual input is an additional important factor in determining self-location 
in this context. It seems that when vision and touch are incongruent, the influence of the 
‘visual information about stroking’ is weaker and not pre-eminent as Meyer implies. Thus in 
the asynchronous condition, subjects’ self-location is closer to where the touch is felt (i.e. 
where their physical body is actually located) than it is in the synchronous condition. 
It should be cautioned that, since different methods were used in these studies (Ehrsson, 
2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2007) it is difficult to make meaningful, direct comparisons 
between them. A recent paper (Lenggenhager et al., 2009) sought to directly compare the 
approaches presented in these studies by using identical body positions and measures in order 
to quantify the conscious experience of self-identification, visuo-spatial perspective, and self-
location. The authors investigated these aspects of bodily self-consciousness while subjects 
were tested in the supine position (as OBEs usually occur in this position (Bünning & Blanke, 
2005; Green, 1968). Subjects were again fitted with an HMD that displayed a video image of 
their body. Their virtual body thus appeared to be located below their physical body (see 
Fig.4). The dependent behavioral measure for the quantification of self-location was a new 
one: a ‘mental ball dropping’ (MBD) task in which subjects had to imagine that a ball fell 
from their hand, and they had to press one button when they imagined that it left their grasp, 
and then another button when they imagined that it hit the floor. The authors proposed that 
MBD estimation would be greater (i.e. the time that subjects imagined it would take for the 
ball to reach the ground would be longer) when subjects’ self-location (where they perceived 
their self to be) was higher from the ground than when it was closer to the ground. The 
prediction in this study was that, compared to asynchronous stroking, (1) synchronous back 
stroking would lead to a ‘downward’ shift in self-location (towards the virtual body, seen as 
though below subjects) and an increased self-identification with the virtual body and (2) 
synchronous chest stroking would lead to an ‘upward’ shift in self-location (‘away’ from the 
virtual body seen below), and a decreased self-identification with the virtual body. As 
predicted, self-identification with the virtual body and referral of touch to the virtual body 
were found to be greater during synchronous than during asynchronous back stroking. In 
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contrast, during synchronous chest stroking there was decreased self-identification with the 
virtual and decreased illusory touch. The MBD time estimates (quantifying self-location) 
were lower for synchronous back stroking than synchronous chest stroking, suggesting that, 
as predicted, self-location was more biased towards the virtual body in the synchronous back 
stroking condition and relatively more towards the location of the visuo-spatial perspective in 
the synchronous chest stroking condition. This study confirmed the earlier suggestion that 
self-location and self identification are strongly influenced by where the stroking is seen to 
occur. Thus, self-location was biased towards the virtual body located as though below (or in 
front) when subjects were stroked on the back, and biased towards the location of the visuo-
spatial perspective (behind/above the virtual body) when subjects were stroked on their 
chests. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Experimental set-up in synchronous (back) stroking condition [top panel] and synchronous 
(chest) stroking condition [bottom panel] in (Lenggenhager et al., 2009). The subject was filmed from 
above and viewed the scene via an HMD. The light-colored body indicates where the subjects’ real 
body was located and the dark-colored body, the hypothesized location of the perceived body (bodily 
self). [Modified version of a figure from (Lenggenhager et al., 2009)] 
It is notable that the subjective upward drift in self-location during synchronous chest 
stroking was correlated with sensations of elevation and floating (as assessed by 
questionnaires). This suggests that when subjects adopt a relaxed prone position - 
synchronous visual-tactile events may interfere with vestibular processing. The importance of 
vestibular (otolith) input in abnormal self-location has already been demonstrated (Blanke et 
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al., 2002; Blanke et al., 2004). Furthermore, there is evidence that vestibular cues may 
interfere with body and self-representation (Le Chapelain, Beis, Paysant, & Andre, 2001; 
Lenggenhager, Lopez, & Blanke, 2008; Sang, Jauregui-Renaud, Green, Bronstein, & Gresty, 
2006). The relatively motionless prone body position of the subjects in this study would have 
minimized vestibular sensory updating and thus may have further contributed to the 
occurrence of such vestibular sensations, highlighting their potential relevance for bodily self-
consciousness and OBEs (see also Lopez et al., 2008; Schwabe & Blanke, 2008). 
 
 
VISUO-TACTILE INTEGRATION, OWNERSHIP AND SELF-
IDENTIFICATION 
 
What explains the importance of the synchrony of tactile and visual inputs for self-
location? The role of visuo-tactile congruence has been studied for a related, though not 
identical phenomenon: the rubber hand illusion (RHI) (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). In the 
RHI, a subject watches a fake hand that is being stroked by a paintbrush in synchrony with 
stroking on his own (occluded) corresponding hand. This can induce the illusion that the 
touch is felt in the fake hand and that the fake hand ‘feels like it’s my hand' (illusory 
ownership or self-attribution (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 
2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005)). There is also a mislocalization of the subject’s hand 
towards the fake hand (drift). The illusory ownership, tactile mislocalization and drift are all 
abolished when the stroking is asynchronous (Austen, Soto-Faraco, Enns, & Kingstone, 2004; 
Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). It seems that the 
temporal congruence of the visual-tactile events is necessary for the change in felt arm 
position and ownership of the rubber hand to occur.  
A recent paper on the RHI (Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008) proposed an explanatory 
model that implicates the role of multimodal integration within peri-hand space. In this 
model, visual information about hand position is weighted more highly (especially when the 
hand is not moving) than information from other modalities (most likely because vision is 
superior at representing spatial location than proprioception). Because of the dominance of 
vision, the brushstrokes that are seen to occur on the rubber hand are processed as though 
they are occurring near the real hand, i.e. the central representation of the location of the hand 
is shifted towards the rubber hand (Lloyd, 2007). Given the temporal congruence of the seen 
and felt stroking these inputs are integrated together as a coherent multisensory event in 
spatial co-ordinates that are shifted towards those of the rubber hand. The authors propose 
that this may result in the sensation of touch being referred to the rubber hand. According to 
this model, it is the referral of touch that induces the feeling of ownership for the rubber hand. 
It should be noted that this direction of causality, although plausible in principle, has yet to be 
verified experimentally. Note also that the size of the drift is generally quite small compared 
to the actual distance between the fake and real hand.  
It is possible that similar mechanisms could explain some aspects of the ‘full body 
illusion’ (FBI), but there are likely to be several important conceptual, behavioral, and 
neurobiological differences. The finding that in the FBI there appears to be referral of touch 
to a virtual body viewed as though at a distance of two meters away is in contrast to the 
finding that the RHI is abolished simply by changing the posture of the rubber hand to an 
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implausible one (Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). Viewing one’s body from an external 
perspective at two meters distance is even less ‘anatomically plausible’ than a rubber hand 
with a misaligned posture, therefore it is perhaps surprising that the FBI occurs under such 
conditions. But perhaps this illustrates that the constraints operating in the FBI are in certain 
ways markedly different to those operating in the RHI. They appear similar in that there is a 
dependence of the strength of both illusions on the temporal congruence between seen and 
felt stroking. However, the constraints regarding the spatial relations between the location of 
the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective and the rubber hand are different to those between 
the location of the origin of the visuo-spatial perspective and the location of the seen virtual 
body. Moreover, in the RHI it is the hand with respect to the bodily self that is mislocalized. 
In the FBI the entire body (in effect, the bodily self) is mislocalized within external space. It 
is therefore to be expected that the spatial constraints operating in these two illusions should 
differ. Could it be that the ‘volume’ of peripersonal space (including personal space) is 
‘relocated’ within extrapersonal space during the FBI? What exactly is the role of vestibular 
cues in these changes, and how do these changes relate to other aspects of the self, such as 
cognitive and conceptual aspects (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009)? At present we can only make 
very preliminary speculations.  
 
 
THE MULTIMODAL FIRST- PERSON PERSPECTIVE 
 
We have seen how the visuo-spatial perspective can be dissociated from self-location in 
healthy subjects (Lenggenhager et al., 2007), has this also been reported in patients with own 
body illusions such as OBEs and autoscopic hallucinations? A recent neurological study (De 
Ridder et al., 2007) showed that after a patient (with tinnitus) received electrical brain 
stimulation at the right TPJ he experienced an OBE during which his self-location was 
dissociated from his visuo-spatial perspective. The patient visually perceived the environment 
from his normal visuo-spatial perspective and not from a disembodied perspective, as is 
classically reported by people with OBEs. Furthermore, patients with heautoscopy – another 
type of autoscopic phenomenon - may experience two rapidly alternating visuo-spatial 
perspectives (and self-locations), leaving them confused about where their self is localized 
(Blanke et al., 2004; Brugger, Agosti, Regard, Wieser, & Landis, 1994). In such patients, the 
visuo-spatial perspective may sometimes even be experienced at two positions at the same 
time and this is often associated with feelings of bi-location: the experience of a duplicated or 
split self (i.e. not ‘just’ a split between body and self as in OBEs; see also Lopez et al., 2008). 
The visuo-spatial perspective is perhaps the only perspective that usually comes to mind, and 
yet vision is not the only modality with an inherent ‘perspectivalness’ (Metzinger, 2003; 
Metzinger, Rahul, & Bikas, 2007) – there is also an auditory perspective (and also 
“perspectives” based primarily on proprioceptive and motor signals; (Schwabe & Blanke, 
2008)). Sounds are heard as occurring in spatial locations that are always in spatial relation to 
the bodily self. Again, in healthy subjects the auditory perspective and visual perspective are 
spatially congruent, and yet patients with heautoscopy may describe spatial incongruence 
between both perspectives (for further examples and discussion see (Blanke et al., 2004; 
Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Studies of OBEs have strongly influenced our scientific thinking on the nature of bodily 
self-consciousness. They have highlighted the fact that bodily self-consciousness can be 
broken down into several components, and the phenomenology of OBEs demonstrates that 
these components are dissociable, suggesting that they may have distinct neural bases. The 
investigation of OBEs has therefore inspired the first empirical studies on the global bodily 
self and the experimental findings so far have shown that it is also possible to dissociate the 
components of the bodily self - to a lesser extent - in healthy subjects. The systematic 
manipulation of the multisensory cues that the brain uses to create a representation of self-
location and identity has begun to reveal the differing importance of these cues and the 
mechanisms underlying their integration. Future studies will seek to develop experimental 
settings in which the bodily self can be manipulated to an even greater degree in healthy 
subjects. In this way we may come to learn about the limits of bodily self-representation. It 
will also be important for future studies to characterize the neural correlates of the behavioral 
changes induced in the FBI paradigms. This will help us better understand the role of the TPJ 
as well as the roles of other cortical and subcortical brain regions in bodily self-
consciousness. Patient and electrical stimulation studies, along with mental imagery studies, 
have implicated the TPJ, but it remains to be seen whether this area is activated in healthy 
subjects during full body illusions. 
Will it ever be possible to experimentally induce full-blown OBEs in healthy subjects? 
OBEs have previously been induced using direct brain stimulation in neurological patients 
(Blanke et al., 2002; De Ridder et al., 2007; Penfield, 1955), but these clinical examinations 
can only be carried out in a highly selective patient population, and related techniques, such 
as transcranial magnetic stimulation do not induce similar effects (Blanke & Thut, 2007). 
Blackmore (Blackmore, 1982, 1984) has listed a number of behavioral procedures that may 
induce OBEs, and it may be interesting for future empirical research to employ some of these 
“induction” methods in a systematic manner in combination with scientific experiments. It is 
important to note that OBEs were not actually induced in the previously reported studies that 
used video-projection (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager et al., 2009; Lenggenhager et al., 2007), 
although there were measurable changes to bodily self-consciousness in these experiments. 
What changes to the experimental methods will be necessary to induce something even closer 
to an OBE? We believe that virtual reality technology, robotics, and techniques from the field 
of vestibular physiology will be important. The use of these techniques may also make it 
possible to study the effects of such procedures on other aspects of self, such as the cognitive 
and conceptual aspects that have typically been studied using self-reports and questionnaires, 
and that have been reported to be associated with the occurrence of OBEs (Blackmore, 1984; 
Irwin, 1985; Murray & Fox, 2005). For example, it has been shown that the occurrence of 
OBEs is associated with psychological absorption (engrossment in mental experience) and 
dissociation (Glickson, 1990; Irwin, 1985, 2000; Murray & Fox, 2005; Richards, 1991). Such 
findings suggest that there may be a pre-existing difference in the bodily experience of people 
who have had an OBE and those who have not had one. Murray and Fox (Murray & Fox, 
2005) have argued that OBEs are more likely to occur in people who have a weaker than 
average sense of embodiment, i.e. a generalized dissociation between their sense of self and 
their body.  
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Many questions remain unanswered. Is there a spatial limit over which referral of touch 
to a virtual body can occur? What other modalities - apart from tactile - could be mislocalized 
during full body illusions? What is the role of sensorimotor contingencies? What role does 
interoception - the brain’s representation of the heartbeat, blood pressure, the digestive system 
etc. - play in bodily self-consciousness? And how do the exteroceptive senses like vision and 
audition interact with interoception in the construction of the self and the self-centered world? 
Answering these questions will lead us closer to a tantalizing and important goal: a 
neuroscientific model of the ‘I’ of experience and thought and of our identity across a 
lifetime. 
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